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Warfare

1) A New Era of Conflict and Violence

A New Era of Conflict and Violence

The nature of conflict and violence has undergone a substantial transformation since the United Nations (UN) was established 75 years ago. Conflicts are now less likely to result in fatalities and are often waged between domestic groups rather than states. It is becoming increasingly apparent that homicide is becoming more prevalent in certain regions of the world, whilst gender-based attacks are rising on a global scale. The long-term impact on development of interpersonal violence, including violence against children, is also more widely recognised.

Concurrently, advancements in technology have given rise to concerns regarding lethal autonomous weapons and cyberattacks, the weaponisation of bots and drones, and the livestreaming of extremist attacks. Furthermore, there has been an increase in criminal activity involving data hacks and ransomware, for example. Concurrently, international cooperation is experiencing challenges, thereby diminishing the global potential for the prevention and resolution of conflict and violence in all its forms.

On a global scale, the absolute number of war deaths has been in decline since 1946. However, it is evident that contemporary conflicts are escalating, with a significant proportion of these conflicts being waged by non-state actors, including political militias, criminal groups, and international terrorist organisations. The prevailing factors contributing to this ongoing state of affairs include unresolved regional tensions, a breakdown in the rule of law, the absence or co-option of state institutions, and the pursuit of illicit economic gain. These factors are further compounded by the scarcity of resources, exacerbated by climate change, which has become a significant driver of conflict.

In 2016, a greater number of countries experienced violent conflict than at any point in almost 30 years. Concurrently, conflicts are becoming increasingly fragmented. To illustrate this point, one need only consider the increase in the number of armed groups involved in the Syrian civil war. Indeed, it is a well-documented fact that the number of such groups has increased exponentially from eight to several thousand since the outbreak of the conflict. Furthermore, the regionalisation of conflict, which interlinks political, socio-economic and military issues across borders, has resulted in numerous conflicts becoming protracted and less amenable to traditional forms of resolution.

In the contemporary era, criminal activity is responsible for a greater number of fatalities than armed conflict. In 2017, the number of homicides worldwide totalled almost half a million, thus far surpassing the number of fatalities in active armed conflicts (89,000) and terrorist attacks (19,000). Should homicide rates continue to increase at the present rate of 4 per cent, Sustainable Development Goal 16 – which includes a target 'to significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere' – will not be met by 2030.

It is evident that organised crime and gang violence exhibit significant variations across different geographical regions. It is evident that countries in the Americas exhibit the highest homicide rates, accounting for 37 per cent of the global total. This is despite the fact that they comprise only 13 per cent of the world's population. The phenomenon of political instability has been demonstrated to be a contributing factor to the emergence of organised crime, which in turn has been linked to targeted attacks against law enforcement agents, women, journalists, and migrants. Concurrently, political violence is no longer confined to low-income states. Over the past 15 years, more than half of the world's population has experienced direct contact or proximity to significant political violence.

For women and girls, the home environment is the most perilous location. In 2017, 58 per cent of female homicides were perpetrated by intimate partners or family members, representing an increase from the 47 per cent figure recorded in 2012. It is evident that women are subject to the most severe forms of lethal victimisation, frequently arising from misogynistic beliefs, systemic inequality, and dependency, which are pervasive global issues, particularly in low-income countries.

Despite the pervasive nature of terrorism, its impact has been diminishing in recent years. Globally, the number of deaths attributed to terrorism decreased for a third consecutive year in 2018, reaching under 19,000. Attacks have become less lethal as governments increase their counter-terrorism efforts, enhance regional and international coordination, and implement programmes to prevent and counter violent extremism. In 2017, 20% of terrorist attacks were unsuccessful, compared with just over 12% in 2014.

Conflict remains the primary driver of terrorism, with more than 99 per cent of all terrorist-related fatalities occurring in countries involved in a violent conflict or exhibiting high levels of political terror. The majority of lethal attacks are concentrated in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, with Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria experiencing the highest number of incidents.

In countries exhibiting elevated levels of economic development, social alienation, a paucity of economic opportunity, and state involvement in an external conflict, these factors are identified as the predominant drivers of terrorist activity. In the context of Western Europe, there has been a precipitous decline in the number of deaths resulting from terrorism in recent years, accompanied by a concomitant increase in the number of incidents. There has been a considerable increase in the number of attacks carried out by actors with far-right, white nationalist, or anti-Muslim beliefs in both Western Europe and North America in the past two decades. The number of incidents recorded in both regions increased from three in 2002 to 59 in 2017, with social media playing a crucial role in the dissemination of xenophobic speech and incitement to violence.

In the contemporary era, extremist groups have gained unparalleled access to the general public through the internet, facilitating more efficient and effective recruitment, incitement, and propaganda, as well as the purchase of weapons and unregulated money transfers. It is evident that both state and non-state actors have the capability to utilise artificial intelligence (AI)-powered deep learning algorithms to generate 'deepfakes', which are convincing synthetic audiovisual representations of individuals uttering words that were never actually spoken by them. This phenomenon has the potential to exacerbate the spread of misinformation, foment social divisions, and engender political instability.

Technological advances are contributing to the changing nature of conflict. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning to enhance cyber, physical, and biological attacks. For instance, enhancing the precision of targeting, complicating the attribution process, and facilitating the execution of attacks by small groups, including so-called 'lone wolves', is a potential strategy.

The advent of emerging technologies has served to diminish the barriers to the acquisition of biological weapons. These are defined as toxic substances or diseases that are employed for the purpose of causing harm or death to humans, livestock, and crops. Concerns have been raised that advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and three-dimensional (3D) printing technologies could potentially enable biological attacks. This is due to the possibility of automating the development and production of weapons and the systems that develop them.

There is also mounting international concern over the development of so-called lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs). These are weapons that have the capacity to identify and engage a specific target without human guidance. If they were to be developed, this would result in the transfer of responsibility over life and death from human moral systems to complex data systems, devoid of an ethical compass. The UN Secretary-General has advocated for the prohibition of fully autonomous weapons under international law, a position that has also been endorsed by over 30 nations.

It is submitted that the most prevalent modern-day threat is that of cyber-attacks. As posited by IBM's X-Force Incident Response and Intelligence Services, the number of cyberattacks increased twofold in the initial six months of 2019 in comparison with the latter six months of 2018. The majority of these cyberattacks were directed towards manufacturers, oil and gas companies, and educational institutes. It is particularly perilous for proprietors of critical infrastructure, as malevolent actors seek to target airport control towers, nuclear power plants, hospitals, and dams. In the preceding year, a total exceeding one hundred cyber incidents with the potential to compromise international peace and security were identified. Such attacks would cause substantial damage and casualties.

Conversely, advancements in AI and other technologies have yielded novel tools and preventive strategies for police and counterintelligence agencies, enabling enhanced protection against attacks and improved identification of perpetrators. However, it is important to note that this approach is not without its own set of potential challenges. A salient example of this is the utilisation of predictive policing, which is accompanied by inherent racial and religious biases that have the potential to engender radicalisation towards violent extremism.

In the contemporary era, there is an observable dissolution of the international arms control infrastructure, accompanied by a gradual retreat from established arms control accords. These accords have historically promoted global stability, restraint, and transparency. The ongoing existence of nuclear weapons poses an increasingly significant threat to the survival of humanity. Despite the significant reduction in the number of nuclear weapons from more than 60,000 during the Cold War to approximately 14,000 today, these weapons continue to possess a considerable destructive capacity. Simultaneously, the relationship between states that possess nuclear weapons is deteriorating, and the discord regarding the rate and extent of disarmament is escalating.

Following the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019, the UN Secretary-General expressed profound regret at the loss of what was widely regarded as "an invaluable brake on nuclear war". It is evident that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is facing a similar demise. It is still possible to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons; however, this will require a renewed commitment to trust and cooperation between the world's most powerful countries. The Secretary-General has issued a call to member states, encouraging them to recommit to existing and pending arms control agreements.

The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 with the principal objective of overseeing interstate relations in the aftermath of the world wars, which had caused widespread devastation and suffering. While the contemporary world is, in many respects, a more secure environment than in the past, the nature of threat has evolved considerably. In order to combat the novel, intricate and sophisticated threats that have arisen, it is essential that there is imaginative and bold responses, as well as strengthened collaboration between states, the private sector and civil society. In order to facilitate collaboration between political, human rights and development partners, it is essential to transcend institutional boundaries.


Warfare

2) Warfare and Strategy

The following two propositions are advanced in this study:

The present text is concerned with the art of generalship.

The utilisation of force for the purposes of the state (at the state or national level) is a significant consideration in this field.

Thirdly, the direction and utilisation of force, in conjunction with the threat thereof, for the purposes of policy as defined by politics.

The following three-step approach will be adopted: firstly, an examination of the definitions will be undertaken; secondly, a discussion of strategy and warfare will take place; and thirdly, the importance of understanding warfare when studying strategy will be concluded with some observations.

Definitions

The definition of warfare appears to be a relatively straightforward concept. In essence, the focus is on the methodology. To illustrate this point, it is important to note that a significant proportion of military history is concerned with warfare and the manner in which armed conflicts have been prosecuted. It is possible that the term is referring to warfare at one of the following levels: national, theatre or campaign, or battlefield tactical. A significant proportion of the historiography of warfare focuses on the mechanics of the tactical level. For instance, there has been considerable analysis of trench warfare in the First World War, as well as the tactics employed in the Battle of Britain.

A distinct dimension of warfare pertains to the manner in which armed forces are to be deployed, or the manner in which they are considered to be deployed, in accordance with established principles and conventions. This constitutes the non-historical element. In the context of armed conflict, history serves as a primary source of insight into potential future outcomes. Consequently, the annals of warfare should serve as a valuable repository of knowledge, providing a foundation for the development of future practices. It could be argued that the primary value of the study of warfare history lies in its capacity to inform practical applications, excluding the value it holds as an interest in itself. A significant proportion of the population, predominantly male, has been observed to experience a high level of interest in this phenomenon. Indeed. Nevertheless, it is imperative to emphasise that the primary value of the study of warfare history lies in its capacity to inform practical applications. The focus of this study is land warfare, a field with which the author has the most familiarity.

The definition of strategy appears to be more problematic. The following three options shall be considered. The objective is for them to be comprehensive, encompassing a wide range of disciplines. Consequently, if the aforementioned strategy is not considered to be one of the above, the reader is invited to question whether it is in fact similar to one of the aforementioned strategies.

The definition of strategy as 'the art of generals' is a complex one, and one which opens up a can of worms. Firstly, it is argued that the term 'art' should be considered synonymous with 'craft'. It is unlikely that the term is employed to denote a distinction between 'art' and 'science', with a view to highlighting the technical aspects. The term is likely to be a reference to the concept of 'craft', as it is commonly understood in the context of military strategy and leadership.

The definition of 'strategy' as 'the artistic or creative element' is problematic. For instance, does the author imply that the creative aspects of a Brigadier General's plan in, for example, the Western Front in the First World War are to be considered as strategy? It is improbable that this will be the case. It is more appropriate to consider 'what generals do' as an aspect of warfare, acknowledging that some elements of warfare are inherently human and thus encompass creative and inspirational aspects. Therefore, for the moment, let us set aside definition (1).

The definition of strategy as (2) 'the application of force for the purposes of the state (at the state or national level)' is a commendable one. In essence, the aforementioned equation can be considered as an equation for the national level in terms of strategy. This suggests the existence of two distinct levels of operation: one at the theatre or campaign level, which could be designated as 'operational', and the other at the battlefield or engagement level, termed 'tactical'. However, it is evident that only a proportion of the concept of 'strategy' falls under this definition.

The aforementioned definition also leaves the question of 'what is a state' unresolved. This issue will not be pursued in the present discussion, except to the extent that it can be stated that the majority of definitions of collective human behaviour should be broad and characterised by relatively loosely defined boundaries.

The definition of strategy as (3) 'the direction and use of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as defined by politics' appears to encompass the majority of what writers describe as 'strategy'. Nevertheless, it is imperative to acknowledge that this does not make any reference to the level of warfare (strategic, operational or tactical). If this is the case, it can be deduced that 'politics' refers to national politics. This standpoint is arguably reasonable; the utilisation of force (or the mere threat thereof) for reasons pertaining to local politics is likely not to constitute war, as is generally understood by the public. Nevertheless, definition (3) still permits the conclusion that tactical matters (i.e. the application of violence at the tactical level) is a question relevant to strategy. This phenomenon presents a notable challenge, as will be further elaborated in the subsequent sections.

Strategy

It is evident that strategy is a field of intellectual endeavour in which writers discuss the direction and use of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as defined by politics. What can be concluded from this?

It is evident that a number of individuals engaged in discourse on strategy appear to be operating on the basis of erroneous assumptions. A dogmatic assertion is not a respectable position. The use of circular argumentation is not a commendable method of reasoning. The validation of weak points is not enhanced by their deliberate presentation. I have had the privilege of attending several of these writers' presentations, and I must say that I have been left even more unimpressed than I anticipated. The presence of strong presentational mannerisms does not serve to legitimise weak arguments. The utilisation of the aforementioned platform for the purpose of rebutting criticisms directed towards flawed arguments is not a commendable endeavour.

A substantial proportion of strategic writing appears to be characterised by a lack of consideration for the potential consequences of its implementation. The term 'armchair generalship' is indeed pejorative, yet it is noteworthy how many policy experts and academics engage in it, typically accompanied by sophistry and with the full awareness that their prescriptions will never materialise as policy or action. The prevailing philosophy of privilege without responsibility is the cornerstone of the Tart's doctrine.

In relation to the aforementioned point, although not entirely congruent with it, is a perception of intelligence. It has been observed that a number of strategy writers do not (or perhaps cannot) use simple, clear language. The following are illustrative examples:

It is imperative to resist the temptation of attaining perfection through the pursuit of absurd standards.

The term 'stylistic inconsistencies' is related to a 'disciplinary matrix'.

The historiography of manoeuvre proponents has been influenced by factors such as 'cherry picking' and 'confusion'.

It has been posited that "interactively complex systems are not additive systems" (Smith, 2019).

The terms 'triune' and 'coherent' are employed in the same sentence.

Einstein is often quoted as having asserted that if one is unable to articulate a concept with ease, one has not fully comprehended the subject matter. This may be an accurate assessment in this particular instance. As an alternative hypothesis, it could be posited that the writers in question are producing their work for a select audience, or are, on a subconscious level, seeking to demonstrate their intellectual acumen. It is evident that both of these approaches are not particularly beneficial.

Nevertheless, it is this author's opinion that the most egregious of sins is that of theology and dogma. It is notable that certain strategists, particularly those who are classified as 'classical strategists', appear to assign a degree of divinity to Clausewitz. The validity of an assertion is repeatedly upheld on the basis of its congruence with the pronouncements of Clausewitz. This prompts the consideration of several issues.

Firstly, how do we know? It is noteworthy that few, if any, strategists possess a high level of expertise in early 19th-century High German. The issue of translation, with its concomitant cultural baggage, is therefore broached. It has been repeatedly asserted that 'such and such' constitutes the sole accurate translation of Clausewitz. The existence of such a phenomenon is, in my opinion, highly questionable. It is evident that 'such and such' is the translation deemed to be accurate by a number of strategy writers. I would be obliged if you would clarify whether this perspective aligns with the Orthodox or Liberal school of thought. Which perspective does this align with – Catholic or Protestant? (And, even then, a range of perspectives exists, including Lutheran, Calvinist, and Church of England views, to name but a few.) Which perspective does this align with: the Sunni or Shia viewpoint? It is evident that the Howard and Paret version is analogous to the Authorised (or King James) Version of the Bible in the sense that both are regarded as seminal texts by numerous strategists. For instance, the admonition that 'thou shalt not suffer a witch to live' offers more insight into King James VI of Scotland than it does into the original scriptures of the Old Testament. This is not intended as a critique of Howard or Paret. This critique is directed towards the attitudes exhibited by a number of strategy writers.

There is, in certain quarters, a zealous and unquestioning adherence to the doctrine that the veracity of Clausewitz's assertions is incontrovertible by virtue of his own authority as a source. It is imperative to acknowledge that this response is simply not adequate. In which other discipline so vital to humankind do we grant almost divine reverence to one long-dead German? If Clausewitz's writings represent the definitive statement on the subject (a position that is questionable), then there is, at the very least, a lacuna in our understanding as to why that should be the case. The fundamental question pertains to the underlying mechanism or causation that gives rise to this phenomenon. It is evident that Clausewitz lacked the omnipotent faculties of a divine being, thus precluding the possibility of a godlike capacity for creation.

The issue of dogmatism is problematic in itself, but does it also have implications for a second issue? The entire domain of conflict studies is characterised by a pervasive sense of paradox. The concept of 'paradoxical logic' is even referenced by Clausewitz. In a recent publication, the authors of a US manual delineated nine paradoxes of COIN. It is evident that a rudimentary understanding of philosophy suggests that the prevalence of paradox can be indicative of an insufficiency in the depth of understanding of the fundamental, underlying phenomenon.

This situation is concerning for three primary reasons. Firstly, the fundamental phenomenon remains to be adequately understood. This is a significant problem in its own right. Secondly, it appears that certain writers acknowledge the incorporation of paradoxes within the conventional framework of conflict-related literature, a phenomenon that may elucidate the identification of nine such paradoxes by US writers. Thirdly, it is evident that many (if not the majority) of writers specialising in strategy have not realised that the prevalence of paradox indicates that the basic, underlying phenomenon is insufficiently well understood. This has the effect of engendering a degree of scepticism with regard to the depth of perception (it can be argued that the thinking is actually superficial) and consequently leading to a rejection of a significant proportion of the written material on the basis that it lacks depth.

It is this author's opinion that the reasons for the almost divine reverence bestowed upon a deceased German individual can be distilled into two distinct categories. Firstly, the subject matter is challenging. The conceptual development process is likely to be challenging. Secondly, the authors who have written on the subject since the 1830s have not been sufficiently perceptive, and not nearly as perceptive as some of them like to think.

The subsequent challenges pertain to the interpretation of the findings. For instance, a substantial proportion of strategy concerns the delineation of means, ends and ways. This assertion is comprehensible. Many strategists posit that this is a Clausewitzian approach.

This assertion is demonstrably false.

Clausewitz (1976) is quoted as stating that there is a dialectic of ends and means, or similar. Regardless of one's interpretation of German words such as 'Zweck' and 'Ziel', it is not possible to translate a dialectic as having three elements. The evidence simply does not support this hypothesis.

It is important to note that this is in accordance with Clausewitz's theory.

It is erroneous to assert that this is what those thinkers ascribe to him; rather, they dogmatically assert the truth of that. This assertion is demonstrably false. The question must therefore be posed: where is the rigour in that?

The concept of 'ways, ends and means' has been introduced into American thinking due to issues such as the House of Representatives' Ways and Means Committee, which was established to align policy with available resources. The term 'ways and means' originates from British parliamentary procedure and was adopted by the American usage. The application of this concept to strategic decision-making is, it can be argued, a rational one. This phenomenon is of a relatively recent vintage. It appears that this term was introduced by an American writer, who may have associated it (perhaps subconsciously) with US Congressional practice. This approach does not align with the tenets of Clausewitzian warfare theory.

One detrimental aspect of strategic thought is dogmatism. It is evident that the argumentation employed in this instance is of a theological nature. The debate among Church scholars centred on the number of angels that could theoretically be positioned on the head of a pin, a matter of little relevance to the real world. Muslim scholars engaged in debate concerning the capacity of camels to traverse the eye of a needle (ditto). It is evident that certain strategic discourses are devoid of rationality. A further issue is the tendency of writers to engage in discourse rather than addressing the phenomena under discussion. The identity of the author of 'B' is of little consequence; the focus should instead be directed towards the substance of the text. The question of whether 'B' was important, sensible, realistic, pragmatic, or otherwise is of far less significance. This phenomenon may be attributed, in part, to stylistic conventions that are held in high regard by academics. However, it must be noted that this approach has the potential to obfuscate the underlying issues. It is evident that there is a preponderance of individuals who engage in the composition of literature pertaining to concepts of an excessively arcane and complex nature, employing language of a similarly intricate nature. This phenomenon appears to be driven by the pursuit of personal satisfaction rather than by any objective of wider dissemination or impact. Fortunately, a significant proportion of the aforementioned phenomenon is likely to occur without any adverse consequences.

Warfare

It is evident that a significant proportion of the population possesses a certain degree of knowledge pertaining to warfare, particularly in the context of the recent two protracted wars in West Asia. The implications of this phenomenon are not clear-cut; it may prove to be either beneficial or disadvantageous. The existence of a substantial corpus of recent, first-hand knowledge is a commendable development. It is unfortunate that a significant proportion of individuals appear to be reluctant to disseminate their knowledge through writing. The underlying reasons for this phenomenon are not immediately apparent and may be multifaceted. The negative aspect of recent knowledge is evident upon reflection. It has been observed that individuals often possess a strong conviction in their personal experiences, which can result in a robust rejection of alternative perspectives, particularly when discussing the manner in which armed forces should engage in combat. This rejection is often characterised by the assertion that the proposed approach deviates from the individual's own experiences. The assertion that the conflict in question does not align with the war one has fought is a matter that can give rise to significant institutional challenges.

Consequently, while first-hand knowledge is important, it is insufficient in itself. A comprehensive and in-depth study of warfare is essential, incorporating a reflective examination of personal and collective experiences. It is believed that Clausewitz wrote something to this effect.

On occasion, strategists have been known to author treatises on warfare. The inclusion of a protracted chapter on the tactics employed during the Battle of Britain in a tome dedicated to strategy is a matter of some perplexity, for three reasons. Firstly, at the time, I conceptualised strategy in terms of 'the application of force for the purposes of the state (at the state or national level)' (2) above. It is evident that the tactics employed during the Battle of Britain were not consistent with those employed in other battles. Subsequently, a re-evaluation of the aforementioned passage was conducted, with the focus now being directed towards strategy as 'the direction and use of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy, as defined by politics' ((3) above). In the discourse on the tactics employed during the Battle of Britain, there was a conspicuous absence of any discussion pertaining to policy or politics. The rationale behind the author's decision to address this subject remains unclear.

The sphere of warfare is subject to some of the same issues as that of strategy. This phenomenon can be attributed to the inherent interconnectedness of the two, as previously discussed. In particular, in writings on warfare, there is often a lack of explanation as to why good pragmatic advice is given as to how armed forces could or should operate. The rationale behind this phenomenon appears to stem from the observation that historical or contemporary counsel frequently aligns with this perspective. This approach is both empirical and pragmatic. In the absence of an underpinning theoretical explanation, it serves well. It is evident that there is scope for improvement.

A particularly unappealing aspect of warfare is what has been termed 'military pornography'. The tendency

to focus on the past exploits of special forces or the Waffen SS is evident. This tendency is characterised by an exaggerated celebration of their purportedly mythical achievements. Many readers will be acquainted with SS Captain Michael Wittman. Of all the graves in the cemetery in Normandy where his remains are buried, his is the only one where the grass is worn down. There is a compelling narrative to be explored concerning Wittman. The text goes on to discuss the appallingly bad tactics employed by the British 7th Armoured Division at Villers Bocage, and the sterling qualities of the British 17pdr antitank gun. However, these aspects are seldom addressed in academic discourse. A dispassionate examination of the combat capabilities of Waffen SS formations frequently asserts that the most proficient units were of a notably high calibre, a phenomenon largely attributed to the adept leadership they received. In contrast, the least successful teams, including some of the most renowned, exhibited a lack of discipline and demonstrated substandard performance. However, these aspects are seldom addressed in academic discourse.

Nevertheless, it is arguably the most significant aspect of warfare that lies in its definition. Warfare is defined as the operational conduct of armed forces. Consequently, it is directly beneficial to practitioners. The present author is engaged in the study of this phenomenon, and has also devoted time to its written exposition. Moreover, the present author has, on occasion, been engaged in its instruction. The present author's ultimate hope is that this endeavour will bear fruit. It is conceivable that this may also be the case in the context of strategy. However, it is a logical conclusion that the number of people who can actually practise strategy is inevitably very small.

Observations

The definition of strategy employed here is as follows: 'the direction and use of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as defined by politics'. It can thus be deduced that there are four (or perhaps five) significant questions to consider.

(1) What are the policy goals?

The following investigation will explore the available meanings of the term 'violent'.

The third issue to be addressed is the manner in which these means should be applied in order to achieve the aforementioned objectives.

(a) In the main, and

(b) In a particular set of circumstances, to what extent does the following apply?

The subsequent section will examine the interactions and emergent behaviours that occur as a result.

The third question, which concerns the general application of means in warfare, is of particular relevance. The third question, which concerns the application of the aforementioned concepts within a specified set of circumstances, is a subject that falls within the purview of military commanders and doctrine writers. However, it is important to note that individuals from other fields can also offer counsel and guidance on this topic, both in the context of military operations and in non-military settings. It is evident that all five questions are pertinent to the domain of strategy. It is therefore evident that an understanding of warfare constitutes a pivotal element of strategy.

This phenomenon is of critical consequence. It is evident that if an individual is engaged in the composition of a text pertaining to strategy yet lacks a comprehensive understanding of warfare, the resultant work will be of substandard quality.

It is noteworthy that there is a paucity of academic departments of war studies that offer instruction in warfare. The subjects taught are typically military history and international relations. A number of these courses are focused on strategy. In the event of such a scenario, the primary focus of the respondents tends to be questions one, two and four above. It is also noteworthy that a significant proportion of individuals who engage in written discourse on the subject of strategy appear to possess a paucity of knowledge with regard to warfare. Should the aforementioned situation apply to you, it is recommended that the preceding paragraph is reviewed once more.

In a previous section of this article, I expressed my disdain for policy experts and academics who are overly dedicated to their fields of study. It is imperative that I refine my remarks. It is evident that certain policy advisors occupy positions of immense significance, wielding the power to influence the trajectory of nations and, by extension, the global landscape. It is incumbent upon academics to dedicate their efforts to the study, composition and instruction of the next generation. The world requires a combination of both. It is evident that writers who do not hold positions such as paid policy advisers or tenured academics can, and do, make significant contributions in this field.

‘Some’.

As previously stated, reference was made to the tart's charter. It is noteworthy that some individuals engaged in prostitution are able to accrue significant wealth, thereby leading a comfortable lifestyle. The most successful individuals are also the most respected. It is not necessary for them to engage in street-based prostitution, and members of the public are often unaware of the fact that their lifestyle is essentially prostitution. However, it is important to acknowledge that the majority of prostitutes are adept at their profession. The lifestyle of these individuals is contingent upon this phenomenon. This is due to the fact that, at some point or other, the punter samples the goods.

This perspective contrasts with that of many strategists.

The following conclusions are posited:

The author was invited to contribute an article to a publication on the importance of understanding warfare when studying strategy.

It is evident that a significant proportion of strategy writers have failed to impress, with this being particularly true of those who are held in the highest regard. It is my belief that certain individuals adopt a dogmatic stance on the subject. It is evident that the prevailing paradigms of strategic thinking have yet to delve into the underlying phenomenon. The preoccupation with Clausewitz is considered to be detrimental to the field.

A knowledge of warfare, defined as the study of how armed forces could, do or should fight, is a critically important aspect to the study of strategy. It is inevitable that writers of strategy literature who lack a solid foundation in warfare studies will produce substandard work. Some do.

The preceding two paragraphs appear to be causally linked.


Warfare

3) Lessons on Public-Facing Information Operations in Current Conflicts

In order to achieve success in the future security environment, it is imperative that the Joint Force adopts a shift in its cognitive approach to information, moving from considering it as a secondary consideration and the exclusive domain of information professionals to a fundamental aspect of all military activities. It is imperative that the Joint Force meticulously designs all activities and operations from the outset in order to account for the use and impact of information on relevant actors.

The Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment is a comprehensive document outlining the strategic framework for the operation of military entities within the information environment.


Information operations targeting the influence of public opinion have assumed an increasingly significant role in contemporary conflicts. It is evident that the study of the impact of public-opinion shaping information operations on the Israel-Hamas and Russia-Ukraine conflicts demonstrates that information environment dominance is increasingly important to a nation's ability to achieve its strategic objectives in modern warfare. In order to be fully prepared for modern large-scale combat operations (LSCO), it is essential that the United States of America apply the lessons learned about cognitive warfare and information domain operations from current global conflicts. The Israeli-Hamas conflict provides a pertinent example for the United States to consider. A democratic nation that has achieved consistent tactical victories may still be susceptible to strategic defeat if its adversary effectively employs cognitive warfare to erode public support. In the context of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, the utilisation of information domain by Ukraine to garner popular support can be regarded as a prime illustration of the effective implementation of cognitive warfare to secure vital international support for its strategic objectives. It is imperative for the United States to prepare for the role that information domain dominance will play in future military conflicts.

The present article will commence with a definition of the key terms employed, followed by a concise discussion of the significance of the information age in the broader context of the present article. In the following section, the manner in which Hamas has utilised cognitive warfare to impede Israel from attaining its strategic objectives will be examined. The following discussion will then contrast Hamas's exploitation of Israel's critical vulnerability in the information domain with Ukraine's effective information domain operations, which secured international support for resisting the Russian invasion. The subsequent discussion will address the United States' emphasis on LSCO, with a focus on identifying potential risks to American military operations in the information domain. These risks will be analysed in the context of the lessons learned from military engagements in Gaza and Ukraine. In conclusion, the present article will propose a series of courses of action with a view to facilitating the incorporation of cognitive warfare into America's military planning, whilst also addressing a counterargument.

Foundation Civilization is on the cusp of entering a new age that is characterised by technological advancement and the rapid dissemination of information on a large scale. Drawing upon the experiences of contemporary military engagements, such as those in Gaza and Ukraine, military tacticians are observing a paradigm shift in the manner in which information is collected and utilised in real-time. This is opportune, coinciding with America's ongoing transition from two decades of counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy to a renewed emphasis on long-standing counter-surveillance (LSCO) operations. However, while significant attention is being directed towards the utilisation of collected information to achieve tactical objectives, there is a paucity of attention being paid to the shaping and public distribution of information to achieve strategic objectives.

In the context of the transition to LSCO-oriented combat, military units are now leveraging the insights gained from operations in Ukraine to further integrate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into their tactical formations. These changes are fundamental to the U.S. military's ability to fight and win in future LSCO scenarios. In the context of the Ukraine conflict, the employment of drones has been observed to have enhanced the efficacy of information, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, thereby facilitating precision targeting. Furthermore, the utilisation of drones has been demonstrated to impede the formation of conventional tactical units, thus complicating the element of surprise. Recent advancements in drone technology have led to an increase in the range and scope of their applications, enabling Ukraine to conduct precision penetrative strikes deep within Russian territory. The most appropriate way to assess the impact of drones is not their immediate relevance but rather whether they represent a revolutionary or merely evolutionary shift in warfare. In favour of the evolutionary perspective, it can be argued that drone warfare has thus far merely modified the tactical battlefield, with no significant impact on the operational or strategic levels of conflict.

A further utilisation of information from the battlefield, namely targeted, public-facing messaging and the employment of internet-based media, has been demonstrated to be efficacious in shaping all echelons of conflict, ranging from the tactical to the strategic level. This utilisation of information from the battlefield for public consumption is designated as cognitive warfare.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) defines cognitive warfare as "activities conducted in synchronization with other Instruments of Power to affect attitudes and behaviours by influencing, protecting or disrupting individual, group or population level cognition to gain an advantage over an adversary."⁴ Cognitive warfare has become a widely recognised part and parcel of everyday life. Examples of this include the online use of troll farms, misinformation and disinformation, and propaganda to manipulate populations' collective perceptions on prominent issues. The use of disinformation has been demonstrated to be an effective strategy for undermining trust in America's democratic institutions and inciting tensions between political groups on both a national and international level.

In addition to the manifest effectiveness of cognitive warfare, its low barrier to entry is a salient factor. The advent of cognitive warfare has rendered traditional military strategies obsolete, as the ability to disseminate information and influence public opinion at minimal financial cost has rendered the traditional battlefield obsolete. Once a false narrative has become ingrained or has gained a high degree of circulation, it will continue to be disseminated by private citizens, often unwittingly, and may even become incorporated into mainstream media narratives. By targeting public perception, every act of cognitive warfare is creating effects that can impact the strategic echelon of decision-making. It is evident that cognitive warfare has evolved into an indispensable element of contemporary strategy. This paradigm necessitates the meticulous tailoring of messages to suit diverse global audiences and the strategic timing of counter-narratives to pivotal points within conflicts.⁵

During the Global War on Terrorism, cognitive warfare led to a decline in collaboration between local populations and U.S. troops, thereby hindering the recruitment of support for the war effort. This dynamic is particularly salient in the context of terrorist organisations, which were able to recruit more individuals to their cause as a result. The Army is gradually coming to recognise the significance of the information domain in the contemporary era of social media and the internet. It has been acknowledged that the propagation of misinformation or disinformation within the information domain poses a significant risk to the execution of missions, particularly in instances where timely, accurate, and credible information is not disseminated in a comprehensive and timely manner. In response to this challenge, the Army has formulated a set of guidelines, termed 'doctrine', which delineates the manner in which military commands are expected to orchestrate coordinated responses to public affairs crises.

Hamas's Cognitive Warfare Campaign

The maintenance of public support has long been recognised as a key element of a nation-state's ability to conduct combat operations.⁸ This is particularly true in democratic nations today, where leaders must maintain popular support to stay in power. Despite the severity of the Hamas terrorist attack of 7 October 2023 and the ongoing national security threat it poses to Israel, Hamas has effectively influenced the public narrative to such an extent that Israel may be unable to achieve its strategic objectives despite having superior military strength. It is evident that this was not merely a fortuitous consequence of prevailing circumstances; rather, it was an asymmetric advantage that Hamas effectively utilised from the inception of the conflict.

The 7 October terrorist attack was characterised by its distinct brutality. It is estimated that the militant group Hamas has been responsible for the deaths of over 1,200 Israeli citizens, in addition to committing acts of rape, torture, and the desecration of corpses against civilian populations. Furthermore, Hamas took over two hundred hostages, who have reportedly been subjected to torture and killed. At the time of writing this article, it is estimated that Hamas continues to hold the bodies of many of the hostages. It is evident that Hamas has articulated a resolute intention to perpetrate future attacks of a similar nature against Israel.

The attack was expeditiously designated "Israel's 9/11," and Israel garnered initial international support for a military retribution campaign, with stated objectives of eradicating Hamas and recovering the hostages. The initiation of this campaign exhibited strong parallels to the American authorization for the use of force subsequent to 9/11. However, following two decades of the United States' War on Terrorism, nations have become cognizant of how to engage with Western democracies that possess overwhelming military superiority.

The Hamas organisation's cognitive warfare campaign was ready. During Israel's previous military operations against Hamas in Gaza, the country initially enjoyed public support, yet this support was subsequently lost due to the media's portrayal of the Israeli military's aggressive tactics. Following 7 October, Hamas anticipated a renewed opportunity to disseminate disinformation through the effective exploitation of multimedia, including video and still images, accompanied by statistics of dubious credibility. The media was inundated with reports of Israel's purported mistreatment of Palestinian refugees, the targeting of protected buildings, and other wartime atrocities, all of which were intended to subvert public support.

By means of cognitive warfare, Hamas is exposing one of Israel's critical vulnerabilities: its vulnerability to being influenced by allies who are concerned with public opinion. It is evident that the State of Israel must accept a certain degree of culpability for its actions, as it has demonstrated an inadequate regard for the occurrence of collateral damage. However, a crucial aspect that has been conspicuously absent from the narrative is the acknowledgement that Hamas is manipulating these incidents not out of a genuine need but as a deliberate tactic to amplify their impact through the utilisation of false or misleading statistics. Hamas has a strategic approach to the location of its headquarters and weapons caches, opting for highly populated and well-protected facilities, such as hospital basements, which offer a combination of security and accessibility. It has been asserted that Hamas exerts a degree of control over the offices of the Palestinian government responsible for reporting inaccurate civilian casualty figures. It is evident that Hamas continues to disseminate inaccurate and unsubstantiated casualty figures through the official channels of the Palestinian government, which are then reported as factual by media outlets.

Utilising cognitive warfare and the public's susceptibility to a narrative sympathetic to the Hamas movement, which is driven by the unsavoury realities of LSCO, Hamas has positioned itself to fully exploit its asymmetric advantage: its ability to affect international pressure on Israel. Notwithstanding the unthinkable situation created by Hamas on 7 October, Israel has been cast as the aggressor in this conflict and is rapidly losing public support for its strategic objectives. It is evident that Israel is complicit in this course of action.

In the aftermath of Israel's commencement of military operations, widespread protests have emerged on a global scale, including within the United States. These demonstrations have exerted significant pressure on political leaders, compelling them to withhold support for the military intervention and to pursue the establishment of a ceasefire. Concurrently, U.S. officials have asserted that Hamas is making "unreasonable" demands during ceasefire negotiations and has not yet released its hostages, thereby prolonging the conflict.¹⁶ The effective utilisation of cognitive warfare by Hamas has placed Israel at risk of being compelled, under international pressure, to accept a ceasefire agreement that is incongruent with its strategic objectives, despite its superiority in power and its consistent tactical victories. Israel may find itself under pressure to accede to a ceasefire, despite being aware that any minor concessions made by Hamas will be unlikely to be honoured in the future and that the group will continue to launch attacks on Israel. Even if Israel does not fully acquiesce to international pressure for a ceasefire before it has achieved its objectives, it will be compelled to make tactical decisions and impose further restrictions on its rules of engagement (ROE). The imposition of such limits has the potential to expose the troops to an increased risk or to restrict the available options for the most efficient achievement of objectives.

The Israel-Hamas conflict has the potential to represent a significant turning point in the role of the information domain in LSCO. Notwithstanding the long-standing role played by information domain operations, this represents a novel phenomenon. A state of markedly inferior strength initiated a military campaign against a more powerful neighbour, with no possibility of achieving conventional tactical victories. However, the state was fully prepared to attain strategic victory through the implementation of information operations. Consequently, cognitive warfare became Hamas's centre of gravity, since it is necessary for Hamas to achieve its strategic objectives and prevent Israel from achieving its own.

At the time of writing this article, the manner in which the conflict will be resolved remains unclear. However, it is evident that Hamas's exploitation of Israel's critical vulnerability to cognitive warfare is enabling a weaker opponent to potentially defeat a conventionally stronger enemy. A parallel can be drawn between Hamas's information domain dominance and the early days of the Ukraine conflict. In that instance, international support combined with Ukraine's resolve allowed it to resist the initial onslaught of the Russian invasion.

Dominating the Public Narrative: The Resistance of Ukraine to Russia

The initial phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been characterised by a series of successful information operations, which have enabled Ukraine to maintain its receipt of vital international assistance. In the absence of this assistance, Ukraine will be unable to continue its resistance to the more powerful Russian military. Ukraine's early information operations had a significant impact on domestic support, fostering widespread support for international sanctions against Russia and maintaining the momentum behind these measures. Furthermore, these operations succeeded in persuading numerous countries to contribute substantial financial resources and military support to Ukraine, amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars in equipment and assistance.

At the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the initial strategy employed by the Russian forces was one of rapid overthrow. In an overt and calculated public relations campaign, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine sought to garner support through the medium of rousing speeches and the adept exploitation of his showmanship skills. Zelenskyy's messaging proved instrumental in galvanising the Ukrainian populace, fostering widespread support for the resistance and inspiring a determination to persevere in the face of considerable personal sacrifices to resist Russian domination. This enabled Ukraine to withstand the initial onslaught against a formidable opponent with significant superiority in power and capabilities. Despite the ongoing artillery onslaught targeting civilian population centres by Russia, its progress in terms of land control has largely stalled, resulting in a protracted war of attrition.

In addition to maintaining the domestic population's will to fight, Zelenskyy's charismatic leadership gained overwhelming international support. Zelenskyy has travelled extensively, delivering numerous addresses on Ukraine's challenges and Russia's alleged war crimes. This engendered rapid and early momentum within the international community, which was readily prepared to embrace a narrative of resisting Russian aggression. In the early stages of the conflict, public discourse emphasised Ukraine's heroic resistance and Russia's egregious violations of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). Furthermore, discourse even extended to contemplating the psychological well-being of Russian President Vladimir Putin, hypothesising that his actions might be indicative of a terminal illness leading to a decline in rational thought.

The ongoing Ukraine conflict has elicited a strong emotional response from the public, with a continuous flow of real-time photographs, video evidence, statistics, and compelling narratives being distributed through both mainstream and social media. Social media websites such as Reddit have facilitated continuous discourse on the conflict in real-time, amassing a substantial corpus of individual posts and responses. In such conversations, comments expressing support for Russia are often the subject of derision and fact-checking by regular users. These comments are frequently subjected to downvoting, resulting in their relegation to the lower echelons of the post hierarchy, where they are unlikely to be noticed by casual readers. Pro-Ukraine narratives have been identified as the prevailing discourse within the majority population.20 This is of particular significance given that 86 percent of Americans now obtain their news from digital platforms, with more than half of U.S. adults accessing news through social media at least occasionally.

In response to the substantial international public support for Ukraine, nations across the world have adopted various measures. In response to the ongoing geopolitical situation, a number of countries have imposed a series of restrictive measures targeting Russia's national resources, financial sector, and the private assets of its oligarchs. In addition, several nations have severed economic relations with Russia, while private enterprises have faced mounting pressure to divest from Russian assets. The imposition of these sanctions compelled Russia to undergo a comprehensive economic restructuring, thereby giving rise to a deepening of domestic tensions between the populace and their leaders. Despite the limited success of international sanctions in deterring Russia, due to the nation's ability to circumvent them, these measures have resulted in an escalation in Russia's operational expenses and an isolation from several international markets.

Perhaps most significantly, Ukraine has been directly supplied with advanced weapons systems, access to technology and intelligence, training, and billions of dollars of munitions. Zelenskyy has persisted in his role as a national fundraiser, undertaking global travels and issuing daily statements regarding Ukraine's requirements. He is leveraging support and exerting pressure on nations to maintain Ukraine's prominence in public discourse, thereby ensuring sustained pressure on leaders to support Ukraine. The functionality of the system is confirmed. Ukraine continues to receive increased funding, more sophisticated weapons systems, and greater latitude to utilise these systems in an offensive capacity within Russia's borders. It is able to continue resisting Russia while also slowly improving its ability to strike deeper into Russian territory, thus bringing the consequences of warfare to the Russian people.

Analogous to the Gaza conflict, a weaker opponent is impeding a stronger force from achieving its strategic objectives by leveraging public opinion to influence international support. Ukraine's resistance, in conjunction with international support, has transformed what Russia anticipated would be a three-day operation into a multiyear, protracted conflict. This has had the effect of weakening Russia's international standing. While the outcome of the conflict remains to be seen, it is important to acknowledge the significant impact of Zelenskyy's ability to shape the global public narrative on Ukraine's determined resistance against a significantly more powerful adversary.

In the absence of ongoing international support, Russia is poised to swiftly attain its strategic objectives in Ukraine. It is therefore vital for Ukraine to exercise control over the public-facing information domain if it is to achieve its strategic objectives. The role of public support in the Gaza and Ukraine conflicts provides a compelling lesson for the United States: international public support can enable a weaker opponent to resist a nation that significantly exceeds them in power. This phenomenon can be observed through two distinct channels: firstly, via the international support that weaker nations receive (as evidenced by the case of Ukraine); and secondly, through the constraints imposed on the actions of stronger nations by international pressure (a pertinent example of this would be the actions of Israel). It is imperative that America pays close attention to the role of the information domain and its ability to shape a conflict at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Considerations of Cognitive Warfare in Multidomain Operations within the Context of the United States

The United States is cognizant of its international reputation and is susceptible to the repercussions of losing public support when engaged in protracted combat operations. The Army is undergoing a rapid transformation into a division-centric fighting force designed for technologically modern, total LSCO. In consequence, some subject-matter experts (SMEs) are being reassigned from brigade staffs to the division or higher. It is imperative that the United States acknowledges its vulnerability to public pressure and prepares all echelons for their role in defending against cognitive warfare attacks. Failure to do so will allow America's adversaries to outmaneuver it at all echelons in the public-facing information domain.

As the transition to LSCO preparedness progresses, a centralisation of many information operation SMEs at higher echelons than the brigade is being implemented. These personnel include civil affairs and public affairs personnel. This has the effect of reducing information operation considerations in tactical planning at a time when such considerations should be increasing.

The efficacy of cognitive warfare is contingent on its application against democratic nations that prioritise public opinion; however, its effectiveness is diminished when employed against authoritarian regimes that do not accord public opinion a significant degree of consideration (with the exception of instances where it is employed to augment support for the adversaries of the aforementioned authoritarian regime). Consequently, authoritarian regimes possess an asymmetric advantage when employing cognitive warfare tactics against democratic nations. For instance, during the War on Terrorism, the United States imposed tactical guidance that constrained the military's available courses of action in response to negative public opinion. In contrast, its adversaries demonstrated a disregard for even basic LOAC standards. This overly restrictive COIN-era ROE has been identified as something that could present a risk to mission and personnel in a LSCO conflict.

During the COIN era, the United States engaged in a protracted conflict with the Taliban in Afghanistan, achieving a stalemate despite overwhelming military superiority. In light of prevailing public sentiment, the United States promulgated an excessively restrictive ROE, despite the absence of any legal obligation to do so. Concurrently, the Taliban, who did not adhere to any ROE, was being given material support by America's enemies, and America did not publicly confront those countries that were providing this support. The failure of the United States to achieve its strategic objectives in Afghanistan can be attributed to the resilience of the Taliban. In the event of a future LSCO conflict, it is imperative to acknowledge that the United States will not be in a position to allow a recurrence of the aforementioned conditions.

When the Army identified the steps required to transition from COIN back to LSCO, Lt. Gen. Charles Pede, who was then the Army's judge advocate general, identified a cognitive gap. During the COIN era, the Army's overly strict application of ROE was limiting commanders' legal manoeuvring space.23 Pede described this as a policy-driven, public-perception-cognizant application of ROE that resulted in self-imposed limitations on the use of force. He then went on to highlight policy-driven commentators who were providing inaccurate descriptions of what LOAC requires and accusing America of violating their erroneous standards, when in fact America was in compliance with the established legal standards. The outcome was a multitude of individuals (some well-intentioned, some not) erroneously accusing America of ROE and LOAC violations, with predictable consequences for public opinion and international support. At times, this caused America to further restrict its ROE, increasing risk to personnel.

Pede's article is (in part) an effort at countering misinformation by publishing accurate information to help inform the conversation. This counter-effort in the information domain is a response to false narratives about the lawfulness and legitimacy of American actions. This operation is of a cognitive nature and is classified as an information operation.

As with Israel, the United States of America is vulnerable to asymmetric cognitive warfare and must prepare to defend itself against such tactics. As Pede observed, LOAC permits a considerably more expansive utilisation of force than that which became the norm in COIN. A comprehensive LSCO scenario will require commanders to have a broad range of legal options at their disposal. In the event that America finds itself confronted with an actual LSCO scenario, it would be prudent for it to contemplate the fact that its tactical approach is likely to differ significantly from that employed by Israel. It is evident that America's adversaries, who demonstrate a flagrant disregard for the principles of LOAC, are likely to employ the same unlawful strategies that Hamas has utilised in its confrontations with Israel.

The United States was confronted with allegations of LOAC violations that were both erroneous and damaging, even in instances where it was adhering to the overly stringent COIN-era ROE standards. In LSCO, the question arises of how America's military will minimise risks to civilians in order to differentiate its own tactics from those that have been widely condemned in Gaza. It is imperative to consider the manner in which the United States of America will proceed in its efforts to disseminate the public narrative concerning the severe and challenging realities of armed conflict.

In the context of future conflicts, it is imperative for the United States to anticipate the implementation of cognitive warfare campaigns by its adversaries, with the objective of hindering the achievement of its strategic objectives. In order to prevent the loss of both domestic and international support when the enemy engages in cognitive warfare, it is vital that America is prepared to offer a timely and accurate counter-narrative. This counter-narrative must be disseminated to a potentially receptive audience through well-intentioned media and other public institutions. It is imperative that America's frontline tactical echelon fighting units develop a comprehensive understanding of their role in the information domain fight.

Prior to the initiation of hostilities, a public-facing information domain battle will ensue over the narrative of who is justified in the use of force. In the event of hostilities, the brutality of war will be highlighted for the purpose of diminishing public support. The enemy is expected to employ strategies designed to place the United States in situations that are challenging to the point of being unfeasible. The aim of these strategies is to create negative narratives that will be utilised in information operations designed to weaken the resolve of the American public. Should American military units fail to incorporate this into their strategic planning, they may find themselves lacking the necessary preparation.

It is imperative that America's military institutionalises and operationalises the integration of physical and information power. The American military is not adequately incorporating information domain operations into its military decision-making process (MDMP) at all stages of planning.

The Application of Theoretical Knowledge in Practical Settings

It is imperative that the Army plan for and utilise public-facing, integrated information operations at each echelon, from the strategic to the tactical levels. Firstly, the Army must assess whether it has adequate information domain SMEs at the appropriate echelon units. Secondly, the Army must adopt a proactive approach to the integration of information operation planning, as opposed to a reactive stance. Thirdly, it is recommended that the Army give due consideration to the capabilities and potential applications of cognitive warfare with a view to expanding the scope of its operations.

It is imperative that the Army first ensures that units at all echelons are appropriately equipped with the tools and expertise needed to integrate information operations into their planning. In accordance with the restructuring of LSCO that is centred on the division, there will be a consolidation and realignment of brigade-level public affairs and civil affairs slots into the division echelon or above. In accordance with the Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment, the Army is required to evaluate whether the brigade possesses sufficient subject-matter expertise in cognitive warfare to incorporate it into their planning processes. At the operational and strategic echelons, this expertise should be systematically integrated into the MDMP process. The implementation of integrated planning strategies would consequently yield operation orders that would encompass guidance for subordinate units, thereby facilitating the incorporation of these considerations into their own planning processes. It is imperative that operational and strategic commands conduct their own public-facing information operations as a component of their multidomain operations. It is imperative that tactical units give full consideration to the manner in which their actions will impact information operations and the manner in which they can provide support to these operations.

The United States is cognizant of the fact that its adversaries will disseminate false information to the general public and violate the laws of war (LOAC) in a manner that will place American military forces in situations that are challenging. At the strategic and operational levels, information operation planning should be anticipating LOAC violations by the enemy, as well as the methods the enemy will utilise to entrap American soldiers into actions that, whilst lawful, are subject to negative portrayal in the media. It is imperative for the United States to anticipate the potential for its lawful tactical actions to be manipulated into informational weapons, with the objective of undermining public support for American operations. Information operations that are proactive in nature and are designed to maintain control of the narrative will assist the United States in converting tactical success into strategic victory. Such operations are also important in preventing the enemy from effectively wielding misinformation and disinformation.

It is imperative that tactical echelon units be prepared for the potential of such traps. It is imperative that tactical units report to higher headquarters when enemy cognitive warfare traps are deployed. This enables the American military's operational and strategic elements to conduct their own information operations.

Furthermore, the Army is obliged to provide precise training on ROE in order to assist commanders in cultivating a mindset that is firmly rooted in the actual requirements. At the tactical level, and further down to the individual soldier, it is imperative to emphasise the principle of "do no harm" by ensuring that soldiers refrain from committing acts that could be perceived as giving the enemy strategic advantage in a cognitive warfare context. This was evidenced repeatedly in Operation Iraqi Freedom, where aggressive detention policies and crimes by individual soldiers undermined global support and increased insurgent resistance to all American forces. It is imperative that every soldier is aware that one of America's key asymmetric advantages over its adversaries is its global reputation for upholding the international rule of law, and that their individual actions have the capacity to undermine this.

Thirdly, the United States should utilise its historical role as the primary proponent of the international rule of law and its own capacity for operating in the public-facing information domain to proactively prevent its adversaries from achieving their strategic objectives. In instances where adversaries violate the laws of war (LOAC), the United States must exercise its influence by emphasising their criminal actions and pursuing legal redress. Tactical-echelon units should be on the lookout for such violations and relay this information to operational-echelon commands that are prepared to publicise and highlight the bad acts of adversaries to the global audience. While this approach may not prevent all illicit activities, it is expected to increase the financial costs for those engaging in such behaviour. It is to be expected that other nations may be disinclined to enter into a alliance with such undesirable entities, in light of the fact that they will thereby become associated with such illegal acts.

Furthermore, it is recommended that the United States proactively enhance its global reputation by emphasising its positive contributions on the global stage and fortifying existing alliances. This will serve to strengthen America's global posture and public support, whilst concomitantly strengthening those of partner nations.Indeed, if proactively integrated into operational planning, America should perceive informational operations and thematic messaging as a strength rather than a liability.

The integration of information operations into MDMP at all echelons will enable the Army to adopt a proactive approach to the planning of cognitive warfare campaigns, as opposed to a reactive stance. When operating at full capacity, the United States is able to leverage its reputation as the leading supporter of the international rule of law in order to dominate the information domain and place its adversaries in a defensive posture that increases their cost of doing business when they violate LOAC.

Planning for Cognitive Warfare and the Military's Apolitical Tradition

The American military is characterised by its commitment to apolitical conduct among its members, a principle that underpins its operational practices.³⁰ A potential counterargument to the present article could be that its recommendations might lead to a significant politicisation of tactical military operations. This counterargument must be rejected on the grounds that the information age has fundamentally altered the relationship between the battlefield and the public-facing information domain. In light of the potential for America's adversaries to employ battlefield tactics aimed at shaping public opinion, the United States military must adapt its approach in order to maintain its competitive edge. This adaptation can be achieved without compromising the nation's established apolitical traditions.

The public-facing information domain is now an integral component of multidomain operations, exerting a direct influence on tactical, operational, and strategic considerations. While messaging guidance and strategic-level decisions must be made at the appropriate level, tactical units must remain cognizant of these considerations and appropriately factor them into their planning. This approach aligns with the long-standing American military tradition, which emphasises that military leaders at all levels must possess a comprehensive understanding of national objectives and the strategic implications of their actions.

In conclusion, whilst it is imperative that information domain considerations are incorporated into planning at all echelons, it is acknowledged that such considerations will be commensurate with the echelon in question. Information considerations at the tactical level will be informed by operational orders and other guidance from higher-echelon units, while key information operations will remain the responsibility of the operational or strategic echelons.

Appropriate tactical planning is instrumental in ensuring that individual soldiers and units comprehend the secondary effects of their actions, thereby potentially influencing the conduct of specific operations. Furthermore, the system will assist ground-level units in identifying scenarios devised by adversaries with the intention of exploiting American soldiers for propaganda purposes. In the event of an enemy combatant operating within the confines of a medical facility, it is incumbent upon tactical units to have already formulated a comprehensive plan to address such a scenario. It is imperative that tactical-level units comprehend the necessity to expeditiously convey such information to the higher echelon where the public-facing information domain fight is being administered.

At the operational and strategic levels, there should be an integrated information domain plan in which civil affairs, legal, and public affairs are involved in the planning and can immediately engage in preparing countermessaging. This will assist the United States in holding its adversaries accountable for their own LOAC violations while protecting American interests from misinformation, disinformation, and other cognitive warfare campaigns.

It is imperative for Army leaders to exercise caution in order to maintain their neutrality, particularly in the context of cognitive warfare. It is imperative that public-facing information operations be meticulously synchronised with the strategic echelon. This will not result in a substantial alteration to the American military's long-standing policy of maintaining a political neutrality; rather, it will guarantee that the military remains aware of all potential threats to achieving its strategic objectives.

Conclusion

In his critique of legal commentators who are unfamiliar with the realities of war, Pede invited his readers to imagine the well-intended, overly stringent, COIN-era ROE standards being imposed upon American soldiers during the largest battles of World War II. In information age warfare, it is necessary to imagine that those historical battles are being video recorded, with particular scenes selectively edited and mass-distributed on social media within minutes of the event. The dissemination of these images is orchestrated by troll farms and bots, which utilise automated processes to proliferate their content across various social media platforms, including X, YouTube, and Instagram. These platforms are inundated with a carefully curated narrative, aimed at influencing public opinion and disrupting established facts. These videos are designed to expose the harsh realities of war to influence public opinion against the war.

In the event of future hostilities, it can be posited that the American military may lawfully target entities not included in the no-strike list. This is predicated on the assumption that the enemy has deliberately positioned its command nodes beneath these structures, thereby leveraging an unlawful advantage. The hypothetical enemy planned to force the United States to target these buildings, aware that the world would hold the United States to a higher standard, irrespective of the legal standard or military necessity in LSCO. Media commentators and private citizens are sharing these feeds and calling for public pressure campaigns to influence elected leaders to apply a more restrictive ROE on American soldiers. However, these commentators do not appear to appreciate the risk to mission and risk to personnel that such calls for action entail. This is the reality of the information age war, in which a picture, video, or tweet with a high degree of virality has the potential to influence international events. It is imperative that all echelons of American military units be prepared for the prospect of cognitive warfare.

The Israeli-Hamas conflict provides a valuable case study, offering insights into a nation that has demonstrated a marked superiority in terms of military power and has achieved consistent tactical victories. However, this dominance is tempered by the effective utilisation of cognitive warfare strategies by the opposing force, which poses a significant threat to the nation's long-term strategic interests. In comparison, the role of the public-facing information domain in the Ukraine-Russia conflict offers lessons about the successful application of information operations to further Ukraine's strategic interests. In the context of future conflicts, the United States is likely to encounter comparable challenges arising from the attempts of adversaries to exercise dominance over the information domain through the dissemination of misinformation and disinformation. In order to be fully prepared for modern LSCO, it is imperative that the United States applies the lessons learned about cognitive warfare and information domain operations from current global conflicts.


Warfare

4) Navy to Decommission Littoral Combat Ship Fort Worth

The United States Navy has announced its intention to decommission the Freedom-variant littoral combat ship, USS Fort Worth (LCS 3), in a ceremony to be held on 29 July at 10 a.m. PDT at Naval Base San Diego.

It is evident that Fort Worth and its crew played a pivotal role in the defence of the nation and the maintenance of maritime freedom. This was achieved through their function as an operational unit and a test platform. The city of Fort Worth and its Sailors played a pivotal role in determining the operational configuration and deployment capabilities of the present-day LCS platform.

The Honourable Gordon England, former Secretary of the Navy, will deliver the principal address at the decommissioning ceremony. It is also to be noted that remarks shall be provided by the following individuals: U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Matthew Kawas, the ship's sponsor's proxy; Ms. Jill J.R. Labbe; and U.S. Navy Capt. (ret.) Warren Cupps.

The ceremony will pay tribute to the service and legacy of Fort Worth, as well as the professionalism and dedication of its Sailors and their families.

LCSs are fast, optimally manned, mission-tailored surface combatants that operate in near-shore and open-ocean environments, and have been shown to be effective against 21st-century coastal threats. The LCS is designed to integrate with a variety of teams, including joint, combined, manned, and unmanned units. This integration is essential for the execution of forward presence, maritime security, sea control, and deterrence missions on a global scale.

The LCS class is comprised of two variants, Freedom and Independence, which were designed and constructed by two industry teams. The USS Fort Worth is a Freedom-class LCS, constructed in Marinette, Wisconsin. Austal USA is at the vanguard of the Independence-variant team in Mobile, Alabama, for LCS 6 and the subsequent even-numbered hulls.

By retiring early-hull test platforms such as Fort Worth, the Navy is able to redirect investments towards upgrading the remaining LCS inventory with enhanced capabilities. This strategy is instrumental in maintaining the viability of the LCS program, thereby underscoring the Navy's commitment to the development of America's future fleet. It ensures that active ships remain relevant, combat-credible, and reliable throughout their service lives.

For a period of 250 years, American naval power has been deployed to project strength on a global scale, with operations conducted on a continuous basis, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. This operational tempo demands continuous capability, and the Fleet of the Future is the solution to this challenge.



Warfare

5) From the First Call to the Final Shot

Air Force Police Squadron Builds Combat-Ready Defenders

A patrolman from the 569th U.S. Forces Police Squadron had just settled behind the radio when reports began to come in.

Routine status checks rapidly evolved into updates from the entry control point. On 23 July, these updates revealed that a suspicious package had redirected defenders across the training area at Kapaun Air Station in Germany. The presence of a drone in the area, along with the subsequent simulation of casualties, led to a reduction in the number of airmen available to respond to the situation.

As opposing forces pressed the perimeter, every report passed through Air Force Senior Airman Rodney Richburg, the patrolman responsible for the radio communications, before being relayed to the relevant leadership. For Richburg, this constituted his inaugural experience in the role of radio telephone operator during a field training exercise; the exigencies of the moment did not permit much time for reflection on subsequent steps.


The individual in question stated that the radio was, in effect, his sole responsibility during the period in which the other parties were engaged in shooting activities. "Patience is of the essence. Prior to the dissemination of this information, it was imperative to compile a comprehensive report that would provide a detailed account of the situation."
Richburg was one of 14 defenders participating in the FTX, which concluded two weeks of security forces level 100 instruction with the police squadron. The instructors presented a series of scenarios, applying pressure on the airmen to implement the theoretical knowledge they had acquired in the classroom while responding to an evolving defence of a simulated forward operating base throughout the day.

Air Force Staff Sergeant Kane Dew, the police squadron lead training instructor, stated that the objective of the exercise was not to achieve perfection; rather, it was to establish an environment in which airmen could collaborate while managing competing priorities.

Instructors developed the exercise with a focus on training injections to achieve the objective. These injections entailed scripted events characterised by dynamic threats and concerns that were subject to change without prior notice. The intention behind this approach was to introduce complexity to the battlefield environment.

"During our field training exercises, we administer multiple injections to observe the defenders' responses," Dew explained.

The rapid tempo of the piece left little room to differentiate between one obligation and another. Richburg was not observing the exercise from a command post. He was in the process of carrying his rifle alongside the rest of his team, whilst simultaneously balancing his responsibilities on the ground with a constant flow of radio traffic.

He engaged in the systematic collection of information, the organisation of reports, and the allocation of attention to suspicious activity in his patrol area as new scenarios emerged.

As Richburg progressed through the training area's forest, he became cognizant of the practical application of the fundamental principles he had previously acquired in the classroom. The conditions underwent a rapid transformation, which outpaced the capacity of the lesson plan to anticipate such changes.

Smoke bombs and flash grenades were detonated. Airmen, experiencing elevated levels of stress, articulated their concerns with fervour via radio communication. There was a considerable exchange of gunfire, with bullets being fired in all directions. The sounds of simulated injured personnel attempting to apply tourniquets reverberated across the mock battlefield, while Richburg endeavoured to maintain composure and guide the team.

It was at this point that he came to understand that effective communication was the foundation of every decision made during the exercise, as evidenced by the increasing number of his team members who were being eliminated.

The ability to provide accurate data from the field was contingent on the efforts of his teammates, who were required to ensure the veracity of the information before the report could be communicated. Furthermore, the team's reliance on him for the organisation of information into comprehensible visual representations, which leaders could then act upon, served to reinforce the notion that no defender succeeds in isolation.
Dew (n.d.) posits that effective communication is of paramount importance for the success of a mission. "In the absence of effective communication, there is a risk of overlooking crucial details. In the event of negligence, physical harm is a potential consequence."

The focus of one defender became the focal point of another, with transmission thus becoming the unifying element underpinning every position on the field.

Richburg posits that it is imperative to have faith that one will be supported by their peers. It is imperative that all personnel, regardless of their role or position, adhere to the protocol and procedures governing their duties. This encompasses the actions to be taken in scenarios such as the clearance of a room, the request for a medical evacuation, or the monitoring of the gate.


Warfare

6) DIA Headquarters Auditorium Renamed for Intelligence Pioneer

Recently, the Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, held a meeting with intelligence community professionals at the headquarters of the Defense Intelligence Agency, located at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling in Washington. The purpose of the meeting was twofold: firstly, to express gratitude to the professionals for their work, and secondly, to pay tribute to one of the community's founding members, Army Lt. Col. Thomas Knowlton.

In the headquarters of the agency, there has been a renaming of Clapper Leadership Hall to Thomas Knowlton Leadership Hall.

Hegseth's assertion that Thomas Knowlton was a warrior in the Continental Army and the father of American intelligence is accurate. It was General George Washington, the nation's first commander in chief and the first individual to be considered the true spymaster of the country, who commissioned Knowlton in 1776. This was to form the military's first dedicated intelligence gathering unit. Washington was acutely aware that triumph is often achieved not solely through military strength and armed conflict, but also through elements of secrecy, strategic deception and long-term foresight. He was acutely aware that accuracy and the timeliness of intelligence are fundamental to achieving strategic dominance."

Following a series of significant defeats in the early stages of the Revolutionary War, which were attributed to intelligence failures, Washington recognised the necessity for the Continental Army to establish an elite unit specialising in intelligence and reconnaissance.

Subsequent to this realisation, Washington selected Knowlton to lead the Continental Army's inaugural intelligence unit, which would subsequently become known as Knowlton's Rangers.

Washington selected Knowlton to command the unit on the basis of his experience as a scout in the French and Indian Wars, and his leadership at the battles of Breed's Hill and Long Island.

The unit, which comprised 130 men and 20 officers, was tasked with conducting reconnaissance, carrying out raids against British facilities, and undertaking other perilous covert missions.

It is evident that Knowlton met his demise in September 1776, whilst leading his men at the Battle of Harlem Heights. It is widely acknowledged that his contributions, in conjunction with the establishment of Knowlton's Rangers, marked the inception of military intelligence.

Hegseth informed the leaders that, in a manner analogous to Knowlton's provision of intelligence to Washington during the American Revolution, the contemporary intelligence community ensures that the United States' military is equipped with the intelligence required for daily decision-making.

"It is impossible for me to carry out my professional duties without reference to the considerable, unrelenting and frequently unrecognised efforts that you make on a daily basis," he stated. As stated by the defence intelligence community, the work conducted within these facilities and beyond, on a global scale, serves as the fundamental basis for the nation's defence strategy.

During his visit, the Secretary also distributed coins to several military personnel and engaged in discourse with leaders on the impact of department-wide transformation efforts, including the restoration of the warrior ethos, the rebuilding of the military, and the reestablishment of deterrence, on the defence intelligence community.


Warfare

7) DASW Alvaro Smith Remarks On U.S.-China Defense Relations at the PRC Embassy (As Prepared)

The strategic vision articulated by the leadership earlier this year serves as the foundation for our deliberations. The pursuit of a stable and peaceful environment, the facilitation of equitable trade practices, and the cultivation of mutually respectful relations with China are of paramount importance.

In the contemporary era, the military relationship between the United States and China is stronger than it has been for many years. The present author is pleased to report that, under the auspices of Secretary Hegseth, efforts are underway to effect the restoration of a military-to-military channel that has previously been damaged, and that is showing signs of steady progress. This is evidenced by the present author's attendance at the present meeting.

The Department has adopted a novel approach to the military relationship, predicated on candid, respectful, and unambiguous dialogue with a genuine interest in de-escalation, while concomitantly advancing the nation's priorities.

This is the manner in which two powerful militaries should engage, and over the past year and a half, this has been achieved.

In the Department of War, the prevailing philosophy is to observe the world as it is, rather than as one might wish it to be. The approach adopted is one of flexible, practical realism, with a clear-eyed perspective on global affairs, which is essential for advancing national interests.

As Secretary Hegseth observed in Singapore earlier this year, this clarity is particularly salient in the Pacific region, which has profound implications for American security and prosperity.

It is for this reason that our national defence strategy provides clear direction to the Department of War to set the military conditions required to achieve a lasting and favourable balance of power in the region.

It is imperative to acknowledge that the region in question constitutes a significant Pacific power, and as such, it would be imprudent to disregard this fact. This commitment is further reinforced by the ongoing collaboration with regional allies and partners in the defence of U.S. interests.

In pursuing and defending our interests, it is imperative to reiterate that the objective is not to instigate conflict with China. It is acknowledged that the maintenance of open channels of military-to-military communication serves to mitigate the risk of misperception, prevent miscalculation, and enhance mutual comprehension.

These exchanges function as a credible channel for crisis prevention, and it is our desire for this communication to endure, regardless of broader strategic dynamics.

Over the past eighteen months, the professional interactions between defence establishments have become increasingly productive.

This progress is attributable to the exchanges facilitated by our Defence Attaché offices and regular senior-level dialogues, including my frequent meetings with Major General Liu and my annual engagements with Major General Ye Jiang at OIMC.

The genuine commitment demonstrated by these partners in executing the shared vision of our leaders has been instrumental in maintaining positive momentum. Their collaboration has been instrumental in the development of a novel approach, and their contributions are deeply appreciated.

It is evident that the senior leadership of the two parties have engaged in further discussions that serve to reinforce the established path. This is evidenced by the meetings held between Secretary Hegseth and Admiral Dong, as well as the meetings between Under Secretary Colby and Ambassador Xie and Executive Vice Foreign Minister Ma.

The provision of vital opportunities for the sharing of perspectives, the delivery of candid messages, and the repair of a once-broken military-to-military communication channel is of paramount importance.

It is anticipated that the present candid and respectful communication shall be built upon in future interactions.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to articulate the approach of the United States to its defence relations with China, and to acknowledge the progress that has been made in this area. This statement is made on behalf of Secretary Hegseth, Under Secretary Colby, and Assistant Secretary Noh.


Warfare

8) Contracts for July 28, 2026

It has been reported that All Points Logistics, Merritt Island, Florida, was awarded a contract with a firm-fixed-price of $250,000,000 for the processing of space vehicles. The contract stipulates the establishment of facilities dedicated to the processing of space vehicles. The work is to be carried out at the Vandenberg Space Force Base in California, with an expected completion date of 30^(th) July 2029. The procurement process for this contract was competitive, with four offers being received. The Space Systems Command, which is based at Los Angeles Air Force Base in California, is the contracting authority (FA8802-26-C-0005).

It has been documented that Vivsoft Technologies LLC, a company based in Herndon, Virginia, was awarded a firm fixed price other transaction agreement for the Aerospace Readiness Enterprise System requirement, with a value of $100,000,000. This agreement provides for the modernisation of the Department's aircrew scheduling, training management, and standardisation and evaluation capabilities. The performance is scheduled to take place in Herndon, Virginia, with an expected completion date of 22^(nd) July 2030. The procurement process for this contract was competitive, with three offers being received. At the time of award, research and development funds amounting to $3,530,268 are being allocated for the fiscal year 2026. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, which is based at Hanscom Air Force Base in Massachusetts, is the contracting authority for this project (FA8730-26-9-B004). The accolade was bestowed on 23^(rd) July 2024.

NAVY

The Boeing Co., Seattle, Washington, is awarded a not-to-exceed $213,000,000 modification (P00010) to a cost-plus-fixed-fee undefinitized contract (N0001924C0025). This modification adds scope to procure non-recurring engineering to support the reconfiguration of four P-8A Multi-mission Maritime aircraft previously procured by a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customer. This endeavour will entail a modification of the aircraft configuration in order to align with the customer's precise operational requirements. The execution of the project is scheduled to occur predominantly in Seattle, Washington (91%) and to a lesser extent in Huntington Beach, California (9%), with an anticipated completion date of December 2031. The total amount of funds that will be committed at the time of award is $74,895,757, which are held by FMS as customer funds. It is evident that the contract in question was not completed. The contracting activity is the Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland.

DRS Laurel Technologies Partnership, Largo, Florida, was awarded a $68,322,385 firm-fixed-price modification to a previously awarded contract (N6339423C0006) for the manufacturing, assembling, testing, and delivery of Vertical Launching System associated kits. This contract encompasses acquisitions on behalf of the U.S. government (87%) and the government of the Netherlands (13%), within the framework of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. The project is to be conducted in Largo, Florida, with an anticipated completion date of July 2027. The financial resources allocated to procurement in fiscal 2026 (Defense-wide) amount to $41,797,353 (61%), to shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) $16,973,361 (25%), to FMS (Netherlands) $8,630,986 (12%), to other procurement (Navy) $592,701 (1%), and to research, development, test and evaluation (Defense-wide) $327,984 (1%). Funding will be obligated at the time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme Division, Port Hueneme, California, is the contracting activity. (Awarded July 23, 2026).

Compass Systems Inc.,* Johnstown, Pennsylvania, has been awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee order amounting to $49,896,823 (N6833526F1132) against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N6833526G1010). This endeavour constitutes a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Phase III effort for Topic N201-015, entitled "Autonomous and Intelligent Aircraft Maintenance Technologies." This initiative draws from the findings of Phase I and II, with the objective of transitioning proven Phase II technologies from prototype demonstration to operational deployment across multiple Fleet Readiness Centers (FRC). The work remains within the original SBIR scope, encompassing automation, digitalisation, and the digitalisation of depot-level maintenance processes. The project also involves the implementation of immersive augmented and virtual reality training, with the overarching objective being the implementation and sustainment of these technologies across the entire fleet. The Phase III effort will perform applied research and development, engineering integration, and technology transition tasks necessary to mature, deploy, and sustain advanced manufacturing and digital technologies across the FRC enterprise. The execution of the project is scheduled to occur in two distinct locations: Johnstown, Pennsylvania (80%), and Patuxent River, Maryland (20%), with the projected completion date set for July 2031.

It is anticipated that the following funds will be allocated at the time of award:

- Fiscal 2026 working capital (Defense) funds amounting to $450,000;
- Fiscal 2025 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds amounting to $9,910,000; and
- Fiscal 2025 Next Generation and Research, Exploration, and Development funds amounting to $600,000. The contract was completed with a single offer received. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, located in Lakehurst, New Jersey, is the contracting entity for this project.

Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., a corporation based in Melbourne, Florida, has been awarded an order amounting to $21,081,363, which is a cost-plus-fixed-fee and firm-fixed-price order (N0001926F1043) against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N0001925G0003). This order is for non-recurring engineering, which includes the development of software, modifications to the E-2D Avionics Flight Management Computer, systems engineering, integration, and test activities. The purpose of this engineering is to integrate the Second Generation Anti-jam Tactical Ultra High Frequency Radio (SATURN) for NATO capability into the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft. The order further encompasses the fabrication and distribution of 94 kits for the modification of Saturn. The execution of the project is scheduled to occur in Melbourne, Florida (99.1%); West Chester, Ohio (0.6%); Ronkonkoma, New York (0.2%); and Laval, Quebec, Canada (0.1%), with an anticipated completion date of April 2028. Furthermore, the financial resources allocated to the procurement of aircraft for the Navy in the 2026 fiscal year, amounting to a total of $21,081,363, are to be committed at the time of award. This order was not completed. The contracting activity is the Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland.

Green Build USA LLC, a company operating under the business name of Federal Contracting Protocol, located in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, has been awarded a contract with a firm-fixed-price of $10,877,052. This contract is classified as having an indefinite delivery and indefinite quantity, and pertains to the procurement of roofing sustainment, maintenance, and repair services. The work is to be carried out at the Philadelphia Naval Business Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and is expected to be completed by August 2031. In addition, overhead (Navy) funds amounting to $69,600 for fiscal 2026 will be allocated at the time of award and will not expire at the end of the fiscal year. The procurement of this contract was conducted through the System for Award Management website, with four offers being received. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Philadelphia Division, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the contracting activity (N64498-26-D-1020).

ARMY

CAPE-APTIM JV1 LLC, a company based in Norcross, Georgia, was awarded a contract with a budget of $200,000,000. This contract, which is classified as cost-plus-fixed-fee and indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, pertains to the restoration of the Standard Chlorine of Delaware Superfund Site. The invitation to tender was distributed via the internet, and three bids were received in response. The precise work locations and funding will be determined on a case-by-case basis, with an estimated completion date of 26^(th) July 2031. The contracting activity is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (W912BU-26-D-A011). (Awarded July 27, 2026).

ACC Construction Co. Inc., a company based in Augusta, Georgia, was awarded a firm-fixed-price contract for the construction of a mission command centre. The total amount of this transaction is $87,580,808, with a total cumulative face value of $92,975,763. The invitation to tender was distributed via the internet, and three bids were received in response. The work is scheduled for completion by 12 July 2029 in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In the 2026 fiscal year, a total of $87,580,808 in military construction and defence-wide funds were allocated at the time of the award. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Wilmington, North Carolina, is the contracting authority (W912PM-26-C-A017).

Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., a company based in Stratford, Connecticut, was awarded a modification to an existing contract action, designated W58RGZ-26-C-0008, for an additional $56,789,419 in funding. This modification, classified as a 'purchase order' under the auspices of the United States Department of Defense, pertains to the procurement of advanced military aircraft, specifically the UH-60M Black Hawk Army model. The modification results in the total cumulative face value of the contract equalling $121,789,419. The work is scheduled for completion by 31 December 2027, and will be undertaken in Stratford, Connecticut.

In the 2025 fiscal year, the procurement of aircraft for the Army necessitated the allocation of a budget of $56,789,419. This allocation was made at the time of the award. The contracting activity is the Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

Tirghra JV, LLC, a company based in San Antonio, Texas, was awarded a contract with a firm-fixed-price of $42,500,000 for the provision of cybersecurity systems engineering and program protection support. Following the dissemination of the request for tenders, one bid was received via the internet. The precise work locations and funding will be determined on a case-by-case basis, with an estimated completion date of 26^(th) July 2030. The contracting activity in question is the Army Contracting Command, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan (W912CH-26-DA079). (Awarded July 27, 2026).

General Dynamics-OTS Inc., a company based in Lincoln, Nebraska, was awarded a contract with a firm-fixed-price of $33,911,620. This contract is classified as having an indefinite delivery and indefinite quantity (IDIQ) arrangement. The specific nature of the contract is for empty BLU-129/B low collateral bomb cases. Following the dissemination of the request for tenders, one bid was received via the internet. The precise work locations and funding will be determined on a case-by-case basis, with an estimated completion date of 26^(th) July 2029. The Army Contracting Command, Rock Island, Illinois, is the contracting authority (W519TC-26-D-A026). (Awarded July 27, 2026).

The Dutra Group, a company based in San Rafael, California, was awarded a contract with a firm-fixed-price of $28,175,500 for the maintenance dredging project at Charleston Lower Harbor. The invitation to tender was distributed via the internet, and four responses were received. The work is scheduled for completion by 29 September 2027 in Charleston, South Carolina. As of the time of the award, a total of $28,175,500 in funds were allocated for civil operation and maintenance in fiscal year 2026. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, based in Charleston, South Carolina, is the contracting authority for this project (W912HP-26-C-A013).

DigiFlight Inc., a company based in Columbia, Maryland, was awarded a modification to the value of $20,754,958 (P00002) to contract W31P4Q-25-F-0159 for programmatic support services. The invitation to tender was distributed via the internet, and four responses were received. The precise work locations and funding will be determined on a case-by-case basis, with an estimated completion date of 29 April 2027. The contracting activity is the Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

Lockheed Martin Sippican Inc., Liverpool, New York, was awarded a contract with a firm-fixed-price of $19,791,630 for the production of Stinger missile warheads and fuzes, with an indefinite delivery and quantity. Following the dissemination of the request for tenders, one bid was received via the internet. The precise work locations and funding will be determined on a case-by-case basis, with an estimated completion date of 28^(th) July 2026. The contracting activity in question is the Army Contracting Command, Newark, New Jersey (W15QKN-26-F-A236).

Miller Electric Co. Inc., Reno, Nevada, was awarded a $15,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract to provide construction services for the maintenance, design, construction, or repair of real property facilities. The invitation to tender was distributed via the internet, and three bids were received in response. The precise locations and funding for each order will be determined at the time of order placement, with an estimated completion date of 31^(st) July 2031. The Army 419th Contracting Support Brigade, located at Fort McCoy in Wisconsin, is the contracting entity for this initiative, with a designated contracting number of W911SA-26-D-A022. (Awarded July 27, 2026).

Altech Inc., a company based in Texarkana, Texas, was awarded an impressive contract valued at $13,000,000. This contract, which is of a firm-fixed-price nature, pertains to the modernisation of buildings with the objective of supporting advanced manufacturing capabilities. The invitation to tender was distributed via the internet, and three bids were received in response. The work is scheduled for completion by 29^(th) July 2027 in Texarkana, Texas. As of the award date, a total of $13,000,000 in funds from the Army's fiscal year 2026 aircraft procurement budget had been allocated. The contracting activity is the Army Contracting Command, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan (W911RQ-26-C-A015). (Awarded July 27, 2026).

HME Construction Inc., a company based in Vancouver, Washington, was awarded a contract with a firm-fixed price of $11,502,000 for clamshell maintenance dredging and associated hydrographic and land survey work. The total amount of this transaction is $11,502,000, with a total cumulative face value of $12,999,900. Following the dissemination of the request for tenders, one bid was received via the internet. The work is scheduled for completion by 27 March 2027 in Portland, Oregon. At the time of the award, a total of $11,502,000 in fiscal 2026 civil operation and maintenance funds were allocated. The contracting activity is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Portland, Oregon.

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Mainstream Engineering Corp., a company based in Rockledge, Florida, has been awarded a maximum contract value of $10,357,000 for the provision of aircraft carrier release elements, with a firm-fixed-price agreement in place. This acquisition was made using justification 10 U.S. Code 3204 (a)(1), as outlined in Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-1. The contract is for a period of two years, with an additional three months, and does not include any option periods. The performance is scheduled for completion on 5 October 2028. The Navy is the military branch of the armed forces responsible for the utilisation of military service. The nature of the appropriation in question pertains to the financial resources allocated for the years 2026 through 2028, designated for the purpose of defence working capital. The contracting entity is the Defense Logistics Agency Land and Maritime, which is based in Columbus, Ohio. The reference number for this contract is SPE7M2-26-C-0012.


Warfare

9) Airmen Participate in the World's Largest Multiday March

In the city of Nijmegen, Netherlands, a vibrant display of orange and green flags could be observed suspended from storefronts, balconies and streetlights. This spectacle was accompanied by the presence of lawn chairs, which adorned the neighbourhood streets, contributing to a festive atmosphere. In the period under consideration, restaurants, hotels and camps were filled with visitors from across the globe. It was noted that almost every conversation with a local began with an enquiry as to whether the interlocutor was present for the march.

The response was in the affirmative for a group of airmen who were assigned to the 39th Air Base Wing, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

From 21^(st)-24^(th) July, the subjects under scrutiny participated in the 108^(th) International Four Days Marches, locally referred to as the Vierdaagse, or "Walk of the World". This event saw the participation of thousands of military and civilian participants. The event, which is considered one of the Netherlands' most enduring military traditions, attracted a total of 47,000 registered participants, including 6,455 military personnel representing 38 nations. These participants traversed a distance of nearly 100 miles through a series of marches.

The team from the Incirlik Air Base was led by Air Force Capt. Nicholas Niazian, 39th Air Base Wing executive officer, and it joined more than 500 U.S. military participants from the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Coast Guard. For the airmen, the march represented more than a mere endurance event; it served as an opportunity to demonstrate the physical readiness, mental resilience and teamwork required to execute the wing's mission anywhere in the world.

The subject first became acquainted with the Four Days Marches during his period of military service at Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany, which spanned a duration of five years. The notion lingered in his mind, and upon arriving at Incirlik Air Base, he promptly initiated the assembly of a team.

Niazian (n.d.) stated that he is a staunch advocate of the organisation's daily operations, emphasising the significance of its collaborative efforts with allied entities. The motivation to participate in the event was initially piqued by the notion of a gathering of military personnel from NATO nations, with an emphasis on qualities such as determination, resilience, and esprit de corps. It was subsequently determined that active involvement was imperative.

Over the course of the week, the 12-person team resided alongside military participants from various international backgrounds at Kamp Heumensoord. This provisional Dutch military encampment provides accommodation for thousands of military marchers on an annual basis. During the extended periods spent on the route, the camp functioned as a location for recuperation, narrative exchange and the cultivation of interpersonal relationships among service members.

Following their arrival at the camp on 19 July, the airmen proceeded to undertake a series of tasks. These included the processing of personnel, the making of beds, and the transformation of their assigned sleeping areas into makeshift dwellings for the duration of the week. The tents were adorned with American flags, squadron insignia and unit memorabilia. Rucksacks were being packed, boots were being checked one last time and feet were being taped in preparation for the challenge ahead.

The opening ceremonies and receptions, in addition to long-standing customs, served to congregate service members from across the globe prior to the completion of the initial mile. Participants engaged in the exchange of unit patches, shared meals and forged friendships between the rows of tents, thereby creating connections that transcended the boundaries of uniforms, languages and nationalities.

These traditions are indicative of the military heritage that has defined the event for more than a century.
The march was first held in 1909 as a military readiness exercise for Dutch service members. Since then, it has evolved into the world's largest multiday walking event, while maintaining a strong connection to its military origins. In the contemporary era, military personnel from across the globe perpetuate this tradition by marching in unison, thereby consolidating the relationships that are instrumental in fostering regional stability throughout Europe.

Prior to the break of day on 21^(st) July, the resonant clamour of reveille reverberated through the atmosphere as a substantial number of military participants readied themselves for the imminent commencement of their duties. Equipped with boots, rucksacks and the necessary equipment, the participants commenced their journey towards the designated starting locations, marking the commencement of the first of four successive days of marching through Nijmegen and the surrounding area.

On a daily basis, the 39th Air Base Wing team undertook a march of approximately 25 miles, traversing small villages, farmland and city streets, before returning to base to prepare for the following day's route.

It is estimated that approximately 2.5 million spectators converged on the march, thereby transforming it into a citywide celebration. The streets were filled with exuberant families, accompanied by the resonant notes of music that reverberated throughout the neighbourhoods. Residents were observed distributing water, snacks, and words of encouragement from their front yards and sidewalks. The presence of live music and performances served to invigorate the participants, a phenomenon that was particularly evident during the final day's march into Nijmegen.

As the team approached the final stretch of the race, they received a significant boost in morale when they were invited to join performers, DJs and fellow participants on a large stage for a celebratory event.

"I then directed my attention back to the team and stated, 'We are approaching that stage'," remarked Air Force Tech. Sergeant Blair Pembleton is a military working dog trainer at the 39th Security Forces Squadron. The team members proceeded to the stage without hesitation, where they engaged in a series of actions that included the waving of their national flag and the performance of a choreographed dance routine alongside the other teams. This provided the necessary motivation to complete the final miles of the race."

While the presence of spectators was observed to have a positive effect on the participants' morale, the test of physical endurance, mental resilience and teamwork remained considerable, with the 100-mile course being completed by the majority of participants within the span of four days, with a 20-pound rucksack.

By the day's end, the discomfort of sore feet, the strain of aching shoulders, and the weariness of tired legs had become a customary occurrence. The treatment of blisters, the hand-washing of uniforms, and the repacking of rucksacks were all completed prior to the participants' descent into their bunks, only to awaken prior to sunrise and recommence the entire process.

Air Force Staff Sergeant Fabrizzio Ulate, 39th Security Forces Squadron training instructor, stated that the decision had been taken to undertake a challenging task in a collective manner. "Each individual experiences periods of need for assistance, and each individual also experiences periods of being able to provide assistance to others. Whether it was the distribution of food, water or supplies, or the provision of encouragement during a period of adversity, the objective was achieved through collective effort."

The march demonstrated that, in addition to the assessment of physical endurance, effective interoperability is contingent on the presence and interaction of individuals. By marching side by side with Dutch and other allied forces, living together at Kamp Heumensoord, and sharing the challenges of the event, the 39th Air Base Wing team strengthened bonds that enable multinational forces to operate as a single, cohesive team when called upon.

As posited by Air Force Tech, the specific nationality of the team with which one was walking was inconsequential. Sergeant Melissa Gunderson, Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge of the 39th Security Forces Squadron Standards and Evaluations Department. "Upon the playing of popular songs such as 'Country Roads' or '500 Miles', the entire road was transformed into a unified space where individuals engaged in collective vocalisation. This approach effectively accelerates the passage of time, thereby enhancing the overall enjoyment of the experience."

On the fourth and final day, following the completion of more than 215,000 steps, the team entered Nijmegen for the traditional finish along the Via Gladiola. The streets were filled with spectators who expressed their enthusiasm through cheering. Participants were presented with gladiolus flowers, a long-standing symbol of strength, perseverance and victory.

Military participants who successfully completed all four days were awarded the bright yellow Vierdaagse Cross, a symbol of their completion of nearly 100 miles on foot.

For the 39th Air Base Wing team, the Four Days Marches constituted more than a mere fitness event. It was demonstrated that the requisite resilience was in place to project power, deter aggression and ensure regional stability across the European theatre. It is more than 80 years since the liberation of the Nijmegen region, and yet U.S. service members continue to honour that legacy. They demonstrate that the NATO alliance's greatest strength is not only built through combined operations, but also through the friendships forged between those who serve.


Warfare

10) Service Member Compensation More Competitive Than Many Realize, War Department Says

The War Department initiated the year-long Military Compensation Educational Campaign during the summer months with the objective of assisting service members and their families in comprehending the comprehensive value of their compensation, thereby facilitating enhanced achievement and sustained maintenance of financial readiness.

While the department continues to engage in collaborative efforts with Congress, federal agencies, and military and veterans service organisations to enhance financial security and improve the quality of life for service members and their families, there is a perception that many service members are not fully informed about the comprehensive range of benefits available to them, as explained by Tim Dill, the assistant secretary of war for manpower and reserve affairs.

At the interval of four years, the Department of Defense (DoD) undertakes a review of the compensation provided to service members, with a view to assessing the comparative merits of the benefits allocated to uniformed personnel in relation to those received by their private sector counterparts. The review encompasses a range of benefits, including remuneration, accommodation, subsistence allowances, incentives, healthcare provisions, educational opportunities and retirement benefits.

The most recent Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC), released in January 2025, revealed that service members' compensation is not only competitive with but often superior to that of their counterparts in the private sector.

The Analysis of Base Pay and Allowances

A key finding of the study was that the military compensation package is comparable to that of civilians with analogous levels of education and professional experience.

"A cross-departmental analysis revealed that, on average, officers outperform their civilian counterparts in terms of experience and educational attainment, occupying the 76th percentile," Dill stated.

It was explained that this indicates that military officers are performing better than 76% of individuals in the private sector who have comparable levels of education and work experience. It was further noted that the numbers are even more favourable for enlisted service members, who are in the 83rd to 90th percentiles.

Dill asserts that a comparison of the remuneration of a recent high school graduate in the private sector and a military E-4 may appear similar at first glance, if only base pay is considered. However, a more comprehensive analysis reveals that there are additional factors to be taken into account.

To illustrate, an Army specialist residing in the barracks is exempt from rental payments, while married soldiers receive a housing allowance on a monthly basis in addition to base pay.

Furthermore, the healthcare benefits extended to the soldier include no co-pays, and the same benefits are also available to the soldier's spouse and children.

In addition to regular military compensation, the department utilises specialised incentive pays for critical skills and provides non-monetary benefits, including tax-free shopping at commissaries and comprehensive family support programmes, thereby significantly augmenting a military family's purchasing power beyond their base salary.

Dill asserted the importance of service members and their families comprehending military compensation, while also emphasising the necessity for individuals contemplating military enlistment to possess a similar understanding.

The Military Compensation Educational Campaign is an initiative designed to raise awareness of the comprehensive benefits package offered to service personnel, with the objective of ensuring that young Americans considering a career in the military are fully informed about the potential benefits before making a decision.

Retirement and Savings

Military compensation also comprises retirement benefits.

Dill expounded that the blended retirement system for service members is predicated on two primary elements. The first of these is the conventional 20-year retirement scheme. In accordance with the aforementioned proposal, Dill asserts that active-duty service members will receive 40% of their base pay following a 20-year period of service, with this entitlement becoming effective immediately following their retirement, irrespective of their age.

The second element of the blended retirement system is the Thrift Savings Plan, a voluntary retirement account in which service members can contribute, with the department matching their contribution. Service members who are subject to this system may receive a maximum of 5% in total government matching on their base pay. This scheme comprises an automatic 1% service contribution, with a potential additional 4% in matching funds based on voluntary contributions.

Dill (n.d.) asserts that, due to the phenomenon of blended retirement, service members have the option of being assured that, irrespective of the duration of their service, they will be able to take a retirement account with them. It is evident that immediate contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan are permissible, with the commencement of contributions by the department in year one. Furthermore, the progression of the contributors' careers will coincide with the commencement of their contributions to the aforementioned plan.

The financial resources contributed by members to the TSP are subject to growth through the mechanism of compound interest, in addition to investments, for the duration of their retention of funds within the account.

Education and Experience

In order to facilitate the preparation of service members for life after the military, the department offers educational benefits, credentialing assistance and tuition assistance. Additionally, the SkillBridge programme is offered, which provides transitioning service members with work experience through internships and apprenticeships during their final months of service.

All of these benefits and programs are now also part of the War Department's Project Patriot Pipeline initiative, the purpose of which is to align currently serving service members with mission-critical careers in the department and enable transitioning service members to fill critical vacancies in the defense industrial base.

Dill emphasised that the defence industrial base – that is, the companies that manufacture military hardware and materiel for the War Department – must always be prepared to supply the necessary equipment and munitions in a timely manner.

As posited by the speaker, a potential method of providing support would be to provide guidance to transitioning service members, military spouses and civilians in order to facilitate their transition into defence industrial base jobs.

Dill further elaborated on the comprehensive career prospects available to service members through programmes such as SkillBridge, credentialing programmes, and tuition assistance. These initiatives, as highlighted by Dill, extend beyond mere preparation for post-military careers, offering service members a pathway to pursue meaningful employment even after their military obligations have been fulfilled.

Dill stated that the objective of the year-long Military Compensation Educational Campaign is to facilitate enhanced comprehension among service members, their families, American citizens, prospective future service members, and their families regarding the compensation structure of the military services. The campaign aspires to assist currently serving service members in optimising their utilisation of available benefits.

Dill (n.d.) asserts that, over the course of the subsequent 12 months, there will be ongoing exposure to this message in order to ensure its effective transmission and reception among military service members and their families. "We are going to get comprehensive. With the support of the military service departments, the objective is to assist our warfighters and their families in reviewing and better understanding every aspect of the compensation. The subject is wide-ranging, and there are often many issues with which the public is not familiar; this is something that we are committed to addressing."